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IN DEFENSE OF GROUP-LIBEL LAWS, OR
WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT SHOULD NOT
PROTECT NAZIS
KENNETH LASSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
I disapprove of what you say, Voltaire is often quoted as
saying, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.
We civil libertarians traditionally invoke those words to
support the argument that all speech deserves protection. Ab-
horrent ideas will fester if suppressed, we suggest somewhat pi-
ously, and wither and die if aired. It is a noble, fetching, and
romantic theory, but one to which the horrors of recent history
have put the lie. While we pledge allegiance to the nobility of
the first amendment and worship its sacrosanctity-as we
should-we seem yet to have learned the perils of absolute trust
and blind faith. And so we resolutely refuse to follow the sensi-
ble lead of other countries in prohibiting racial defamation and
group libel.
Item: In the fall of 1971 an American actor named Billy
Frick, portraying Hitler in a film made for German television,
left the production set in full costume and went into a public
bar in Munich. He bore an eerie resemblance to der Fuhrer. It is
not clear whether the appreciative applause of the assembled
patrons was for the verisimilitude of the charade, or simply that
their sensitivities were dulled by gemutlichkeit, but there was
precious little of the fear, disgust, or revulsion that one might
have expected. In fact, Frick/Hitler was warmly received.1 Were
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; A.B., M.A., The Johns
Hopkins University; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law; member, American
Civil Liberties Union. The writer is indebted to several participants in his Civil Liberties
Seminar-notably Allan S. Steinhorn and Elizabeth A. Hambrick-Stowe-who contrib-
uted substantially to the dialogue which yielded the conclusion of this article, and to
Dwight King, Esq., for his research assistance. Different versions of this article originally
appeared in the Duquesne Law Review and the Columbia Human Rights Law Review.
1. STERN, Aug. 18, 1971.
289
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
it not for his obviously innocent motives-he was acting, after
all, and he said he was intellectually curious to see the reaction
he would cause-Frick could very likely have been tried and
convicted under a German law prohibiting the glorification of
Nazism.2
Item: From 1979 to 1984 the number of anti-semitic vandal-
isms in the United States increased 700 percent.3 There is no
gauging the growth in popularity in hate-mongers such as the
Reverend Louis Farakhan, whose notoriety reached a zenith
when he called Hitler a "great man" and Judaism a "gutter reli-
gion" during the last presidential campaign. In many European
countries Farakhan could have been arrested and thrown into
jail.4
Item: In 1985 Ernst Zundel, a German-born commercial art-
ist, was convicted in Canada for publishing a pamphlet declaring
that accounts of the Holocaust are a hoax.6 But in this country
neo-Nazis are free to march through predominantly Jewish sec-
tions of Skokie, Illinois, and the activities of the so-called Lib-
erty Lobby and the Institute for Historical Review, which seek
to deny that the extermination of six million Jews was a matter
of deliberate Nazi policy, continue unabated.
The message is this: racial hatred may be so much a part of
human nature that it is unrealistic to expect it to dissolve, either
of its own limited accord or from the rational development of
human civilization and ethics, but it is wrong to regard as self-
evident the wisdom of the jurisprudential philosophy which
would protect the expression of bigotry on the basis of blind
principle-that is, as a matter of free speech. Put another way,
it is Constitutional folly at one and the same time to prohibit
obscenity and protect Nazi punks. Even consistent civil libertar-
2. Several years later, in fact, Frick was arrested when he appeared as Hitler outside
a fairgrounds in Frankfurt. STERN, Oct. 15, 1973.
3. The actual numbers were as follows: 129 in 1979, 377 in 1980, 974 in 1981, 829 in
1982, 670 in 1983, and 715 in 1984. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAi B'RrrH, 1984 Au-
DIT OF ANTI-SEMITIC INCIDENTS 1 (Jan. 1985).
4. See infra notes 152-157 and accompanying text, for examples of what would hap-
pen elsewhere.
5. Baltimore Sun, Mar. 1, 1985, at 8, col. 1.
6. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RrrH, 1983 AuDIT OF ANTI-SEMrnc INCIDENTS
3 (Jan. 1984). See also Village of Skokie v. Nat'l Socialist Party of America, 69 IIl. 2d
605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
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ians should not find it difficult to fight against pornography stat-
utes and Nazis.
For the most part, the laws which prohibit racial defama-
tion or group libel were enacted subsequent to World War II,
and then primarily in Western Europe, Scandinavia, and Ca-
nada. In the United States they exist in only a handful of states
and have been but rarely tested. Why this is the case-but
should not be-will be the subject of this article.
A. Racism: "The Evil to be Restricted"
Throughout American (and world) history, racism has fos-
tered the occasion for strife, violence, and misunderstanding.7 In
its institutionalized form of slavery, racism underlay -the major
political crisis in United States history, the Civil War. As anti-
semitism it nurtured the Holocaust-the single most terrifying
episode of the twentieth century if not all human experience. It
has been used to justify the genocide of Armenians in Turkey
and Eritrians in Ethiopia. Racism has been called America's "in-
tractible,"8 most "baffling" problem. Is it so much the way of all
flesh that combatting it amounts to little more than a waste of
social energy?
History demonstrates that racism is assailable. 10 Racially-
rooted problems can be dealt with through the law, as was co-
gently illustrated by Arthur Larson in a 1969 law review arti-
cle.1 The two extreme views-that the law is useless to change
7. See F. USTINOV, My RUSSIA 163 (1983); Bixby, The Roosevelt Court, Democratic
Ideology, and Minority Rights, 90 YALE L.J. 741, 754-55 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Bixby]; KERNER COMM'N NAT'L ADvisoRY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 91 (1968); Brown,
Racialism and the Rights of Nations, 21 NoTsR DAME LAW. 1, 1 (1945).
8. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 262 (1952).
9. Bixby, supra note 7 ("the colored problem is the most complicated and baffling of
all our social problems"). Shapiro writes, "[Tihe racial question is the one issue in Amer-
ican life that has at various times proved unamenable to the normal workings of the
political process . . . to become a conflict of principle. Conflicts of principle are, of
course, the one sort of conflict that a liberal democracy, whose life is compromise, cannot
tolerate, for it is possible to compromise interests but not principles." See infra note 25,
at 137.
10. See M. McDouGAL, H. LASSWELL & L.C. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 197 n. 103 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HUMAN RIGHTS].
11. Larson, The New Law Of Race Relations, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 470 (1969). Professor
Larson was, of course, speaking of white-black relations specifically. The principles un-
derlying his arguments are equally applicable to other forms of racism. See also Beau-
harnais, 343 U.S. at 261-62.
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attitudes, or that any gain achieved is negligible-are simply
contradicted by hard evidence.'2 Law in its legislative or judicial
forms may be ineffective where overt racism is widespread and
deeply rooted,13 but unbridled, blatant prejudice has become
somewhat anachronistic, at least in the United States.
In the international community as well, "man's most dan-
gerous myth"' 5 has been increasingly discredited. In 1959, fol-
lowing a rash of racist incidents in Europe and South America, 16
the United Nations adopted a Declaration on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination.1 "[A]ny doctrine of racial
differentiation or superiority," read the statement, "is scientifi-
cally false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous,
and . . . there is no justification for racial discrimination either
in theory or in practice."18 Not only is discrimination said to
deny human rights and offend human dignity, it constitutes "an
obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations among nations and as
a fact capable of disturbing peace and security among peo-
ples. '" 9 In times of hardship or stress, outbreaks of racial hatred
and violence become an expression of frustrated anger, feeding
upon itself in a vicious cycle.2 0 The victimized group is identified
by the attacker according to its race, and is conveniently made
the scapegoat in what can be called "an economy of thought.
2 1
Little if any intellect is necessary to hurl racial epithets, paint a
12. Larson, supra, note 11, at 511-12.
13. Id. at 514. His specific example was the failure of prohibition.
14. Id. See also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Town Seeks
Reason For Synagogue Burnings, Baltimore Sun, Oct. 3, 1983, at Al, col. 5.
15. HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 569 n. 176. The source of the quotation is G.
MONTAGU, MAN'S MoST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE (5th ed. 1974): "The
popular categorization of race ... when indulging in 'man's most dangerous myth' [is]
built upon vague, shifting, and erratic references."
16. HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 585-86.
17. Adopted by G.A. Res. 1904, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 35, U.N. Doc. A/
5603 (1963).
18. Id. at 36. (Preamble).
19. Id. at art. 1. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination was adopted and opened for signature and ratification of GA. Ras.
2106A. 20 U.N. GAOR (1965).
20. See, e.g., Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1954), in D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW 85 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Alport]; Rowan and Mazie, Can The Klan
Come Back?, READER'S DIG. 197 (Sept. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Can The Klan Come
Back?]; Hard Times Trigger Racial, Religious Hate, 11 HUM. RTS. 7 (Winter 1983).
21. See note 20, supra.
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swastika, burn a cross, or blame a minority group for specific
problems. 22 A "free and robust exchange of ideas" 23 is nonexis-
tent; there is a total absence of debate by which each individual
can make up his own mind, on the basis of all the evidence, on
every political-moral issue. 24 Racial defamation short-circuits
the democratic principle of self-government.2 5 By threatening
this basic presupposition, it becomes a substantive evil not only
to those persons directly targeted, but to all society.
B. Groups & Individuals: Interest & Injury
An intimate nexus exists between individuals and the
groups or associations to which they belong. Procedurally, as-
sociations may assert the rights of their members.26 Most courts,
however, have been unable, or unwilling, to depart from the
traditional theory that redress for libelous characterization is
available only where an individual has been injured, or to recog-
nize that the defamation of a group directly injures its members.
America remains a great melting pot, with perhaps greater
diversity of ethnic representation than any other place in the
22. Seymour Lipset suggests in The Sources of the Radical Right, in THE RADICAL
RIGHT, 259 (D. Bell, ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as Lipset] that after World War II, anti-
communist crusades became the vehicle for hostilities formerly directed against Jews;
anti-semitism fell into disrepute, but McCarthyism was riding high. Id. at 289. Lipset's
theory was correct; once McCarthyism declined, racism and its anti-semitic variant again
became-the easy outlet, "white [Gentile] supremacy, cloaked in patriotism and religion."
See Can The Klan Come Back?, supra note 20, at 203.
23. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34-35 (1973).
24. See Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1135 (1979).
25. The danger to "ordered liberty" is not merely violent disruption of public order.
As Professor Riesman noted, discussing Nazi Germany, the leaders utilized a more insid-
ious approach, but one no less dangerous to democratic pluralism than overt violence,
since they "aim[ed] at the political and economic annihilation of groups ... and use[d]
violence only incidentally." Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Li-
bel, 42 COL. L.R. 727, 753 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Reisman, Group Libel]. Both Jus-
tice Douglas, dissenting in Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 284-87, and Professor Shapiro, dis-
cussing the future of the first amendment, seem not to have considered this subtle
danger, equating it simply with overtly violent conspiracy or action: "something close to
a new civil war." M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL
REvEw 46-72 (1966) [hereinafter cited as SHAPIRO]. Similarly, the F.C.C. in 1972 refused
to ban the continued broadcasting of a white supremacist candidate for the U.S. Senate,
saying that it did not rise "above the level of public inconvenience, annoyance, or un-
rest," and that no clear and present danger was posed. See infra text accompanying note
151.
26. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1958).
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world. It has almost literally torn itself apart to effect racial in-
tegration. When destructive attacks on a group are permitted,
individuals within the ranks inescapably suffer." Where Jews or
blacks are defamed as a group, the speaker's target is each Jew
or each black. The same is true with any other racial/ethnic de-
nomination. When a neo-Nazi bemoans the fact that Hitler
"didn't finish the job [of exterminating Jews]," he is not likely
to turn to a Jewish person and say, "Of course, I didn't mean to
include you. '"28
It has been suggested that one type of paranoia is the pro-
jection by one group upon another of its own low self-esteem.2 9
As libel law has traditionally focused on the individual, psychia-
trists have been concerned primarily with the pathology of indi-
vidual paranoia. However, in light of the conflicts, misunder-
standings, acts of violence, and "deaths on a massive scale"
which group-paranoid processes have caused, "psychiatrists may
come to identify them as the most serious pathogenic factors in
our era."30 In short, injury to the self, between individuals, and
among groups is inflicted by the paranoia from which racism
springs, and of which racial defamation is one expression.
Private victims of defamation are more entitled to redress
for their injuries than public figures, because they have not cho-
sen to lead a public life or speak out on public issues so as to
make themselves a target for attack.3 1 In addition, a private per-
son's capacity for self-help is more limited.32 Persons targeted by
27. See Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Time to Time: First Amendment Theory
applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L.R. 935, 949-50 (1968) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Nimmer]; Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 25, at 731; and Tanenhaus,
Group Libel, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 261 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Tanenhaus].
28. Professor Riesman appears to be more preoccupied with the form of the state-
ment than its substance, when he ponders whether "virulent attacks are actually libel-
lous or slanderous." The statement he then refers to, "If I had my way, I would hang all
the Jews in this country," seems clearly to be racially defamatory. It should not be neces-
sary for racial defamation to take some particular form, such as an accusatory slur or
epithet. Reisman, Group Libel, supra note 25, at 751, quoting People v. Nunfo, New
York City Magis. Ct. (7th Dist., Borough of Manhattan, Sept. 20, 1939), stenographer's
minutes 9-10, cited in ABUSES OF CIVIL RIGHTS AS VIOLATIONS OF THE NEW YORK PENAL
LAW 9 (n.d.).
29. Pinderhughes, Understanding Black Power: Processes and Proposals, 125 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1552-57 (1969), in D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 89-91 (1973).
30. Id.
31. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
32. Id. See also Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308, 328 (1979).
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reason of their racial or ethnic identity are in the same position:
they have not chosen their ancestry, which the speaker treats
less as an objective fact than as a subjective course of disparage-
ment.3 3 Individuals within the group are all the more vulnerable
to the defamatory speech. 4
Older cases suggested that the very breadth of the libel
(casting aspersion wholesale upon a large population of diverse
individuals) would undercut the charges.3 5 But this approach
presupposes a more rational response by the speaker's audience
than experience with racial defamation warrants.3 It also fails to
33. See Downs, Racism in America and How To Combat It, in D. BELL, RACE, RACISM
AND AMERICAN LAW 87-88 (1973). Allport describes the process: "An imaginative person
can twist the concept of race in almost any way he wishes, and cause it to configurate
and 'explain' his prejudices." Allport, supra note 20, at 85 (1973). See also HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 569 ("a race is any group of people whom they choose to de-
scribe as a race") (quoting A. MONTAGU, STATEMENT ON RACE (3d ed. 1972)). A- NEIER,
DEFENDING My ENEMY 17 (1979), indicates that in the bitter in-fighting among the vari-
ous neo-Nazi groups, Frank Collin was accused by rivals of having Jewish blood.
34. Neier also indicates that in Nazi Germany, those persons of Jewish background
who had converted to Christianity nevertheless were classified as Jews. The label was
applied for the benefit and purposes of the attackers, rather than to reflect any scientific
or objective fact. Neier, supra note 33, at 26. See also HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 10, at
580. Of course, the concept of race itself is at best amorphous, since "[riaces change, die,
merge with other races, become modified by racial intermarriage .... Race is mani-
festly a transitory fact." Brown, Racialism and the Rights of Nations, 21 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 1, 11 (1945).
Recently, a Louisiana woman challenged her racial classification under a state stat-
ute which labelled her legally "colored" on the basis of 1/32 Negro ancestry. Smart-Gros-
venor, Observed With "Racial Purity," Ms. 28 (June 1983). The obviously fallacious na-
ture of such a racial classification system resulted in the repeal of the law. Editor's Note,
Ms. 12 (Sept. 1983). In some families where negroid and caucasian genetic characteristics
are present, there may be children who look "black" and others "white." The apparently
"white" children then may make an affirmative self-identification of themselves as black
(but probably not vice versa). Conversation with D. Bruce Hanson, Center for Commu-
nity Change, Wash., D.C. (August 27, 1983).
35. Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 25, at 770. In People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc.
142, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Ct. Gen. Sess., N.Y. Co. 1938), the court opined that the law need
not be stretched to protect against group libel. Abuse of freedom of speech would be
effectively restrained by speakers' good sense or, that failing, by awareness that defama-
tory attacks are self-defeating. Id. at 143, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 259. One wonders at what dis-
tance from reality this judge lived. See also Tanenhaus, supra note 27, at 266-73 (dis-
cussing old English and American criminal libel cases involving Jews, civil war veterans,
and Knights of Columbus); Note, Defamation of Group, 21 NOTRE DAME LAW. 21, 22
(1945).
36. See Ailport, supra note 20, at 85. See generally Riesman, Democracy and Defa-
mation: Fair Game and Fair Comment I, 42 COL. L. Rav. 1085 (1942) (discussing use of
libel and slander by fascists) [hereinafter cited as Riesman, Fair Game]. An illustration
is provided infra at note 149 and accompanying text. Judicial tolerance of racial defama-
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take seriously the destructive nature of racism upon civilized so-
ciety.3 7 Whether particular racial characterizations could be
''proven true" is a straw issue which often plays into the hands
of the defamer.38
When the John Birch Society accuses someone of being a
"communist," his denial alone is not a complete cure for the in-
jury to his reputation. A black individual may be in a worse po-
sition when subjected to the slander "niggers are rapists" or
even to the milder proposition "blacks are genetically inferior."
Against the group smear, which inevitably has some partial fac-
tual basis 9 (some blacks are convicted rapists, some have low
I.Q.s), the statement's deleterious effect is not so easily reme-
died. The "intractible problem" of racism is made more so.
The traditional arguments against the constitutionality of
group-libel laws--that there is no injury because no individual is
directly defamed and that society is somehow stronger for per-
mitting self-expressions through the intentional infliction of in-
jurious racial attacks10-are unpersuasive in the light of history,
social science, and common sense.
tion, demonstrated in, e.g., People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142, 154, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257,
268-69 ("It is wiser to bear with this sort of scandal-mongering .... We must suffer the
demagogue and the charlatan, in order to make certain that we do not limit or restrain
the honest commentator on public affairs") reflects a persistent allegiance to the market-
place of ideas. The hard case of racism, however, especially in its extreme form (for
example, Hitler's genocidal practices) is an invariable part of marketplace discussions.
See e.g., Schauer, Speech and Obscenity, 67 GEO. L.J. 889 at 915-16 (1979) (hereinafter
cited as Schauer, Obscenity], (slavery was not a wise policy, Nazism was not correct),
Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1132 (1979). Since the delete-
rious effects of group-directed racism are abundantly evident, the judicial conclusions
that racial defamation of groups inflicts no harm which reasoned reflection will not cure
seems illogical at best. See Nimmer, supra note 27, at 955.
37. Lipset, supra note 22, at 298 also indicates the long-term effect that even an
episodic wave of hate-mongering can have on the social fabric. His illustration: the re-
strictive immigration laws passed in the early 20th century.
38. Riesman, Fair Game, supra note 36, at 1089-1101 (describing European
experience).
39. See Tanenhaus, supra note 27, at 293. Tanenhaus concludes that the problem of
"proof" is a major stumbling block to the enforcement of group libel law. But the judici-
ary is clearly capable of drawing the necessarily fine lines involved in speech claims, so
the first amendment is not merely "an unlimited license to talk." See Konigsberg v.
State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 36 (1961). Courts should be able to address relativity and
partial truth in group libel, as they do for individuals.
40. See e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 286-87 (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Thomas v. Collin, 323 U.S. 516, 545-46 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring); W.O. DOUGLAS,
AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY 363 (1954); 1 N. DoRSEN, P. BENDER, B. NEUBORNE, POLITICAL
AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 570 (4th ed., 1976); Garvey, Children and the
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One commentator has been naive enough to suggest that in
the absence of confrontations with group libel, the ability of citi-
zens to respond intelligently and effectively to racist rhetoric
would shrivel up from disuse: "If we never hear the questions,
we will soon forget the answers.""' The citizens of Germany were
given ample opportunity to confront Nazi racism; that their abil-
ity to respond intelligently did shrivel up resulted in one of the
greatest tragedies of all time.42
The issue is really whether the law is ready to recognize the
nature and extent of the harmful effect ' 3 and whether the courts
are ready to accept group libel as an analytically sound basis for
liability."
First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REV, 321, 363 (1979); Wellington, On Freedom of Expres-
sion, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1131-34 (1979); Note, Offensive Speech and the First Amend-
ment, 53 B.U.L. REv. 834, 854 (1973) (discussing from the perspective of radical black
speech); Note, Free Speech and the Hostile Audience, 26 N.Y.U. L. REv. 489, 498 (1951).
41. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FRE SociE'rY 98 (1981). Professor Haiman articu-
lates no fewer than four other reasons to rebut the argument that group libel is not
protected by the first amendment because it is socially worthless. First, he says that a
racially defamatory statement (e.g., "Jews control the media"), is not empirically verifia-
ble or falsifiable. But even if one cannot prove or disprove that Poles are dumb, Jews
crafty, blacks lazy, or Italians greasy-such characterizations are fundamentally counter-
productive in a free society. If a jury decides that the speaker's motivation was malicious,
he is no more protected by the first amendment than is one who defames an individual.
Second, who is to decide what is "socially worthless"? (The jury in every case). Third, a
group member's emotional distress is the price he must pay for freedom of speech.
(Why? The targets of "fighting words" and obscenity have remedies). Fourth, the Su-
preme Court has been specific in requiring that fighting words have a direct tendency to
cause violence, that personal libel must be proven, and that advocacy must incite immi-
nent lawlessness to be restrictable. (The Court uses whatever language is necessary to
reach its desired result).
42. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. See also correspondence from Charles
S. Sims, 89 YAL. L.J. 1450, 1451 (1979).
43. See Burkey, Racial Discrimination and Public Policy in the United States
(1971) in D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 100-101 (1973); HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 10, at 581-83; Tannenhaus, supra note 27, at 278.
44. Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 25, at 772. Professor Riesman recognized the
speculative nature of damages in group libel, suggesting that the appropriate relief might
be an action in equity for an injunction. Id. at 771-72. See also Tanenhaus, supra note
27, at 290-91 (discussing procedural aspects). In Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,
Justice Frankfurter indicated that whether or not racial defamation laws would solve the
underlying problems, states should be permitted to handle them through "trial-and-error
inherent in . . . efforts to deal with obstinate social issues." Id. at 262.
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II. GROUP LIBEL ACTIONS
A. In the States
Group-libel statutes are currently in the criminal codes of
five states.45 In four of them (Connecticut, Massachusetts, Mon-
tana and Nevada), the gravamen of the offense is holding up to
ridicule, hatred, or contempt of any group or class of people be-
cause of their race, color, or religion.46 The Illinois statute,
changed from that which was upheld in Beauharnais, specifi-
cally requires that the offensive speech be provocative of a
breach of the peace.47
In Illinois, Massachusetts, and Montana there must be a de-
monstrable intent to defame.4" Such a probative requirement is
important: absent proof of specific intent, a statute might pun-
ish unsuspecting distributors of racially defamatory materials
45. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-37 (West 1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 27-1 (Smith-
Hurd 1977); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98c (Michie/Law. Co-op 1980); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-8-212 (1984); NEv. REV. STAT. § 2100-510 (1979). Two states have statutes
which are worded in such a way that a group libel action could be brought. IND. CODE §
34-4-15-1 [2-1043] (1984 supp.) and N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A 43-1 (1984-1985 supp.). Al-
though neither statute specifically states that the member of a defamed group may bring
suit, the New Jersey statute refers only to the plaintiff, while the Indiana statute refers
to the "aggrieved party."
There is some confusion as to the status of several Oregon statutes involving harass-
ment by abusive words (ORS 166.065(1)(b)) and racial intimidation (ORS 166.155). See
State v. Harrington, - Or. App. - (1984) and State v. Beebe, - Or. App. -
(1984).
46. The Montana statute does not specify race, color, or religion, but uses the phrase
"group, class, or association." The Nevada statute includes those defamed to be "person
or persons, or community of persons, or association of persons." Like the Montana stat-
ute, it does not specify race, color, or religion.
47. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 27-1 (Smith-Hurd 1977). The legislative revision commit-
tee in Illinois felt that, insofar as the law of criminal libel was designed to compensate
for or to mitigate the injury to the victim's reputation, it has failed. In addition, the
criminal law should generally not be used to remedy private wrongs. A tort action for
libel or slander is more appropriate and more effective. Consequently, the theoretical
justification for criminal defamation is grounded entirely on the prevention of breaches
of the peace. Id. Committee Comments-1961, revised in 1970 by Charles H. Bowman.
The Illinois statute thus retains one of the principles of Beauharnais, reiterated by Jus-
tice Brennan in Garrison: speech likely to lead to public disorders, such as group villifi-
cation, is not protected. 379 U.S. 64, 70 (1964).
48. The Massachusetts statute requires an "intent to maliciously promote hatred of
any group," while the Montana law punishes one who publishes defamatory matter "with
knowledge of its defamatory character." Illinois uses the language "with intent to defame
another."
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and thus be unconstitutionally overbroad. Indeed, that is what
weakens the Connecticut and Nevada statutes.e
Many legislatures appear to be frightened off by some vague
spectre of unconstitutionality. In Maryland, for example, a crim-
inal group-libel statute was recently considered but never en-
acted after that state's Attorney General offered his opinion that
the Supreme Court's rulings in New York Times v. Sullivan,50
Garrison v. Louisiana,51 and Ashton v. Kentucky5 2 had effec-
tively precluded enforcement of criminal libel laws.53 Similarly,
the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Repre-
sentatives held hearings on proposed group-libel legislation in
1943, but no federal laws on the subject have ever been
enacted."'
B. Beauharnais: Still Good Law
Group libel is a category of speech which has seldom been
tested at the Supreme Court level.55 The last time a group-libel
statute came before the Court was in 1952 in Beauharnais v.
Illinois." This case involved the prosecution of a white suprem-
acist under a state law prohibiting any publication which ex-
posed citizens to the traditional injuries of defamation (con-
tempt, derision, and obloquy) by casting aspersions on their
race, color, creed, or religion .5  Against challenges that the stat-
49. Of course, it could well be argued that specific intent is not necessary-that is,
that publishers and distributors should be aware of the content of what they publish and
distribute, and should be forced to make judgments about its libelous nature.
50. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
51. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
52. 384 U.S. 195 (1966).
53. Opinion No. 82-014 (March, 1982), to be published at 67 Op. Att'y Gen. (Md.
1982). The proposed Maryland statute was neither targetless nor vague; for the reasons
espoused by this article, it should have been regarded as entirely constitutional. See also
State v. Harrington, - Or. App. - (1984) and State v. Beebe, - Or. App. -
(1984), supra note 45.
54. F.S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE Socirry 90 (1981).
55. The Skokie case was not a true test since the legal basis for the town's position
was context-not content-based restriction of the Nazis' speech. Moreover, the fact
that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Skokie does not constitute a decision on the
merits, and has no formal precedential value.
56. 343 U.S. 250.
57. The statute read:
It shall be unlawful. . . to manufacture, sell, or offer for sale, advertise or pub-
lish, present or exhibit in any public place in this state any [publication] which
• . . portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of
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ute violated the free speechand due process guarantees of the
first and fourteenth amendments, and was overly vague, the Su-
preme Court upheld the statute's constitutionality by a five-to-
four split.
For analytic purposes, the dissents in Beauharnais remain
as significant as Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the majority.
Justice Reed assumed the power of the state to pass group-libel
laws, and dissented on the grounds that the statute in question
was too vague. s Justice Jackson agreed that enactment of group
libel laws would be within the power of the states (though not
the federal government)., 9 He dissented because the trial judge
had offered the defendant no opportunity to prove a defense
(fair comment, truth, privilege)," and because there had been no
showing of a clear-and-present danger.61 Justice Douglas sug-
gested that defamatory conduct directed at a race or group in
this country could be made an indictable offense, since, "[l]ike
picketing, it would be free speech plus"'' although he would re-
quire either a conspiracy or clear-and-present danger to support
an indictment.6 3 Only Justice Black considered the defendant's
activity-petitioning for redress of grievances, discussing public
issues, and expressing views favoring segregation-to be fully
protected by the first amendment."
Eight of the nine justices, therefore, indicated that group-
libel laws could constitutionally be enacted. Although the law
means whatever the Court sitting at any given time says it
means, there are sound reasons to believe that a properly
drafted statute prohibiting defamation of a group on the basis of
race, color, or ethnicity would pass constitutional muster.6 5 First,
citizens, of any race, color, creed, or religion which. ..exposes the citizens...
to contempt, derision, [or] obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace
or riots ....
Id. at 251. (Reviewing ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE § 224a, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 471
(1949)).
58. Id. at 277-84.
59. Id. at 287-95.
60. Id. at 295-302.
61. Id. at 302-05.
62. Id. at 284 ("Hitler and his Nazis showed how evil a conspiracy could be which
was aimed at destroying a race by exposing it to contempt, derision, and obloquy").
63. Id. at 284-85.
64. Id. at 267-75.
65. Joseph Tanenhaus devotes a major portion of his article, Group Libel, supra,
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Beauharnais has never been overruled.66 To the contrary, it con-
tinues to be cited by the Court with favor. Second, the Chaplin-
sky 7  conceptual framework on which Beauharnais was
grounded continues to be the starting point for first amendment
analysis. Third, it can well be argued that racial defamation is a
form of verbal utterance that is either constitutionally non-
speech, akin to hard-core pornography, or, like child pornogra-
phy, so near the bottom of the hierarchy of protection as to jus-
tify state proscription and/or civil liability.
Over the years, Beauharnais has been cited in support of a
variety of propositions including: the right of a group to make
assertions on behalf of its members, 6s the importance of narrow
construction in a statute which might otherwise be impermissi-
bly vague or overbroad,69 the equal stringency of the Bill of
note 27, to the form and substance a constitutional group libel statute should take. He
examines critically various state and municipal laws, together with any judicial reaction
(though failure to utilize the laws in most cases resulted in an absence of interpretation).
Several conclusions emerge: (1) there must be well-defined or accustomed usage, in order
to save a statute from being struck down as overly vague; (2) the proscribed content
must be clearly defined, so that protected speech would not be swept within the ambit of
the statute; and (3) the proscribed content must correspond to the justification by which
it is outside the first amendment protection. Tanenhaus concludes that in the United
States, the closer a group defamation statue comes to the traditional law of defamation,
the greater its chances of being upheld. Id. at 297. Beauharnais was upheld on precisely
those grounds. Justice Frankfurter surveyed the law of libel in an extensive footnote,
including the minor variations in different jurisdictions by statute, at common law, and
under the Restatement of Torts, 343 U.S. at 255-57 n.5. He then concludes that criminal
libel "has been defined, limited, and constitutionally recognized time out of mind." 343
U.S. at 258. Justice Frankfurter also noted that "the rubric 'race, color, creed, or religion'
• . . has attained [a fixed meaning]." 343 U.S. at 263 n.18. See also Collin v. Smith, 447
F. Supp. 676, 698 (1978). See generally F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENrrv 154-66
(1976), Ch. 8. "The Requirement of a Strictly Drawn Statute" (discussing overbreadth
and vagueness); SHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 140-43 (discussing least restrictive means,
narrowly drawn statutes, vagueness, reasonableness).
66. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the dissent by Justice Douglas ex-
pressly urged that Beauharnais "be overruled as a misfit in our constitutional system."
Id. at 82.
67. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). ChapLinsky held constitu-
tional a state statute banning "face to face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the
peace by the addressee." Id. at 573. The Court held that this class of speech is not con-
stitutionally protected. The areas of speech in Chaplinsky to which the first amendment
has been applied (offensive speech, libel of public officials and figures) are clearly distin-
guishable from defamation of a racial group.
68. Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1,
184 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
69. Gottschalk v. Alaska, 575 P.2d 289, 292 (Alaska 1978).
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Rights in the scope of its guarantees applied against the states
and the federal government,70 and the validity of social studies
as evidence even though they may not be absolutely conclusive
or irrefutable.71
Each of these propositions is useful in buttressing the argu-
ment that prohibition or punishment of racial defamation is
constitutional. The greatest importance of Beauharnais, how-
ever, rests in its holding that libel is not protected by the first
amendment's guarantee of free speech. Justice Frankfurter's
opinion addressed the issue directly:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited clas-
ses of speech, the prevention and punishment of which
have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the pro-
fane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words
... . It has been well observed that such utterances are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality.7 2
Neither, Justice Frankfurter went on, were the due process or
liberty clauses of the fourteenth amendment violated. Simply
put, defamation may be punished.
Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitu-
tionally protected speech, it is unnecessary . . . to con-
sider the issues behind the phrase "clear and present
danger." Certainly no one would contend that obscene
speech, for example, may be punished only upon a show-
ing of such circumstances. Libel, as we have seen, is in
the same class. 3
Beauharnais thus clearly stands for the proposition that li-
bel is "nonspeech." The language of the Court on this point con-
70.. E.g., First Nat'l. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780-81 n.16 (1978);
Gibson v. Florida Investigative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 560 n.2 (1963) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
71. E.g., Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1002 n. 24 (1969).
72. 343 U.S. 250, 255-57 (1952).
73. Id. at 266.
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tinues to be quoted with favor.74 Those who question the vitality
of Beauharnais appear to be analytically myopic. Apropos is
Mark Twain's comment upon reading the news of his own death:
"The reports . . . are greatly exaggerated. '75
Critics of Beauharnais have suggested that its holding as to
libel and the first amendment was overruled by New York
Times v. Sullivan.76  But that interpretation reads Sullivan,
which was expressly limited to actions brought by public officials
against critics of their official conduct, 7" much too broadly. Sul-
livan did say that no category of speech could be given "talis-
manic immunity" from the first amendment, 78 but the Court was
simply holding that a state could not remove speech from judi-
cial scrutiny merely by the label put on it. 79 The Court has,
without exception, ruled that obscene speech is not protected,80
but, under Sullivan, it insists on looking behind the label to sat-
isfy itself that the expression at issue is truly constitutional
nonspeech.
If only the negative implications of Sullivan were available
for support the continued vitality of Beauharnais as to "libelous
utterances" might indeed be weak. But the case for the non-
speech nature of private libel is strengthened by the Supreme
Court's continuing reliance upon Beauharnais. In several
landmark obscenity decisions (notably Roth v. United States8 1
74. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957); State of Maine
v. John W., 418 A.2d 1097 (1980).
75. Cable from Mark Twain in London to the Associated Press (1897), reprinted in J.
BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 625 (15th ed. 1980).
76. See, e.g., Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. F.C.C., 403 F.2d 169, 174, n.5
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (Skelley Wright, J., concurring); United States v. Handler, 383 F. Supp.
1267 n.22 (D.Md. 1974); Garvey, supra note 40 at 362; Television Violence, 64 VA. L.
REv. 1123, 1200 (1978); Note, Offensive Speech, supra note 40 at 836-39. For a detailed
argument that Beauharnais is "obsolete," having become "unhinged" by Sullivan, Co-
hen, and Gooding, see F.S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREz SocmTy 91-92 (1981). See
also Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308 (1979).
77. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
78. Id. at 269.
79. Finnis, "Reason and Passion"; The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and
Obscenity, 116 PA. L. REv. 222, 229 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Finnis].
80. Insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity,
solicitation of legal business. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269.
81. 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (utterly without redeeming social value). See also Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value).
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and New York v. Ferber8 2) Beauharnais is cited to support the
proposition that libel is not constitutionally protected. In Fer-
ber, the Sullivan holding is expressly characterized as an excep-
tion to the Beauharnais rule.83 If the Court had wanted merely
to validate the idea that certain words are nonspeech, it could
have cited Chaplinsky. By pointing to Beauharnais, centering as
it did on a group-libel law enacted to address the public threat
posed by racial bigotry,8' the Supreme Court appears to have
gone further. A strong possibility is indicated that the Court
would approve a properly drawn and construed statute or a judi-
cial ruling proscribing racial defamation of a group.85
Justice Frankfurter summarily dismissed the argument that
a clear and present danger must be proven before a speaker can
be punished or restrained. 86 Only certain kinds of speech (e.g.,
political opinion) are fully protected-that is, subject only to the
state's fundamental interest in public order. Where speech is
less protected, the state's interest may extend to the prevention
of some other type of harm. Affronts to decency,87 damage to
reputation,88 and injury to the psyche,89 among others, may con-
stitute "substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."90
Ferber uses Beauharnais to illustrate the unprotected nature of
libel,9 ' and goes on to suggest a "codifying" approach toward
content regulation where, "within the confines of the given clas-
sification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs
82. 458 U.s. 747.
83. Id.
84. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 258-263.
85. The Illinois statute in Beauharnais included defamation of religious groups as
well as racial or ethnic groups within its prohibition. This article would limit the reach of
group libel to racial or ethnic defamation. Without doubt, religious bigotry has also been
a source of social strife and individual injury. However, to include religious defamation
would open the courts to what could arguably be excessive entanglement with the free
exercise of religion-a separate, affirmative guarantee of the first amendment. See Jo-
seph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 504-06 (1952). Racial or ethnic defamation,
when cast in the form of religious speech, can be regulated on racial/ethnic grounds.
Genuine religious disagreement thus remains protected under both the free speech and
free exercise clauses.
86. See 343 U.S. 250.
87. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
88. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
89. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747.
90. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
91. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763.
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the expressive interest, if any, at stake.""2 Ferber itself, involv-
ing speech not necessarily obscene, upheld its prohibition.
Even if Ferber did not explicitly classify group-libel as con-
stitutional nonspeech, the content of group-targeted racial defa-
mation may nonetheless be sufficient basis for state regulation.
Thus, in the Skokie-type situation, a finding of imminent public
violence should not be required to sustain a group-libel law.9e
Other critics point to the Supreme Court's decisions in Ash-
ton v. Kentucky 4 and Garrison v. Louisiana" as further proof
that Beauharnais-type statutes would not survive constitutional
challenge today. These critics, however, place too broad an inter-
pretation on those holdings. In Ashton, the Court ruled that
Kentucky's common law offense of criminal libel could not be
enforced because it was too indefinite and uncertain.96 Since no
Kentucky case had redefined the crime in understandable terms,
and since the common law was inconsistent with constitutional
provisions, the defendant's conviction could not stand.9 ' Group-
libel laws, however, suffer no such indefiniteness. Because they
are legislatively enacted, they can be narrowly drawn to remove
uncertainty or vagueness. Citing Cantwell v. Connecticut,"
which had overturned the state's common law crime of breach of
the peace because of indefiniteness and susceptibility to arbi-
trary enforcement, the Court said that such a law must be "nar-
rowly drawn to prevent the supposed evil."99 And in Beauhar-
nais, the statute in question was found to be "a law specifically
directed at a defined evil, its language drawing from history and
practice in Illinois and in more than a score of other jurisdic-
tions, a meaning confirmed by the Supreme Court of that State
in upholding this conviction.' 00 Thus Ashton is clearly distin-
guishable from Beauharnais.
92. Id.
93. See also Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976). To analo-
gize the dictum in Young: few would march sons and daughters off to war to preserve the
citizen's right to utter threatening, abusive, or insulting words, inciting hatred against
the racial or ethnic group of our choice.
94. 384 U.S. 195 (1966).
95. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
96. 384 U.S. 195, 198.
97. Id.
98. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
99. 384 U.S. 195, 201.
100. 343 U.S. 250, 253.
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In Garrison, the Supreme Court invalidated Louisiana's
criminal libel statute, which sought to punish the malicious pub-
lication of anything which exposed any person to hatred, con-
tempt, or ridicule. 01 The statute further provided that "where
such a publication or expression is true, actual malice must be
proved in order to convict the offender." s0 2 In finding the statute
unconstitutional, the Court stated it could find no sound princi-
ple which could make one liable for publishing the truth, even if
the publication was actuated by express malice. 0 3 This is one
distinction between Beauharnais and Garrison; the statute in
Beauharnais did not criminalize publication of the truth, it out-
lawed speech which is devoid of truth-group defamation. But
the primary holding in Garrison involves criticism of public offi-
cials. The Court reiterates the position taken in Sullivan, that
criticism of official conduct by public officials is protected unless
the speech is false and made with actual malice.10 4 Garrison ex-
tends the Sullivan rule to include criminal as well as civil penal-
ties, but it does not apply to the defamation of private citizens
as a group. Both Sullivan and Garrison indicate concern with
preserving the right to criticize government. Neither should be
read to bar group-libel statutes.
The constitutionality of laws proscribing group defamation
by race or ethnic group appears to hinge on the responses of
courts to several fundamental questions. First, is the deleterious
effect of racism so substantively evil as to justify state action to
prevent or counteract it? Second, even if there is such a compel-
ling state interest, does the evil persist where whole groups, not
individual persons, are defamed? And third, is group-libel prop-
erly characterized as speech, somewhere within the hierarchy of
first amendment protection, or can it be classified as totally un-
protected "nonspeech"?
C. Racial Defamation As Speech
The courts have not been oblivious to the patently offensive
nature of racial defamation, in that they are quick to repudiate
101. 379 U.S. 64, 65 n.1.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 73, citing State v. Burnham, 9 N.H. 34, 42-43, 31 Am. Dec. 217, 221 (1837).
104. 379 U.S. at 78.
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the message of the speakers. 0 5 But such repudiation is generally
an apology for their judgment that free speech is protected by
the first amendment. Justice Black interprets the white suprem-
acist literature in Beauharnais as essentially the expression of
political ideas on social issues.106 Various commentators have
taken the same approach. One, for example, says that Nazi
speech (referring specifically to the Skokie situation) is political
in nature, 10 and as such warrants the highest degree of first
amendment protection. Another, referring to the speakers as
"extreme rightwing neo-facists," nevertheless reminds his read-
ers that "political dissent must not be stifled."108 Other expres-
sions of racial and ethnic bigotry are variously described as
ideas, views, doctrines. Though not expressly labelled political
speech, they are treated as contributions to the democratic mar-
ketplace where, for first amendment purposes, there is said to be
"no such thing as a false idea."' 0 9 "Government cannot protect
the public against false doctrine," wrote Justice Jackson in
Thomas v. Collins.1 0 "Each must be his own watchman for
truth . . . [since] our forefathers did not trust government to
separate truth from falsehood for us.""' A state court once ruled
that the speeches of George Lincoln Rockwell, former leader of
105. E.g., Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. F.C.C., 403 F.2d 169; Rockwell
v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 175 N.E.2d 162.
106. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 270 (Black, J., dissenting).
107. Schauer, Speech, supra note 36, at 919. In his later article, Codifying the First
Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 285 [hereinafter cited as Schauer,
Codifying], Schauer seemed to modify this position, suggesting that Collin's speech was
not protected for its own sake-as political speech-but only as a "fortunate beneficiary"
of the courts' desire to protect the broad category of political speech. Id. at 286-87.
Under the broad-category approach to the speech clause, the marginal speech must be
protected to ensure that genuine political speech is not abridged. Under a narrow catego-
rization of speech under a first amendment umbrella of values, the implication is that
such "beneficiaries" would lose their free ride.
108. SHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 136.
109. Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1221, 1245
(1976) (quoting Justice Power in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.). This is the basis for Jus-
tice Douglas' dissent in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. at 284-87. See also Anti-Defa-
mation League of B'nai B'rith v. F.C.C., 403 F.2d 169, 174 (Skelley-Wright, J., concur-
ring) (speech approaches the area of political and social commentary). The speech was
anti-Zionist, but did not attack Jews as a religious group. Under the facts, then Circuit
Judge Burger held that the appeals to reason and to prejudice were impossible to sepa-
rate. Id. at 172.
110. 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 545.
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the American Nazi Party, could not be abridged because, if they
were, "the preacher of any strange doctrine could be stopped." '112
Another offered the noble-sounding opinion that, "we must suf-
fer the demagogue and charlatan, in order to safeguard the hon-
est commentator on public affairs.'
3
Racial defamation is shielded by the first amendment, the
argument goes, for the same reasons that other abhorrent speech
is protected. First, because an opinion (not necessarily the
"truth") is best arrived at in the free exchange of discussion and
persuasion,"" and second, because the risk to democracy from
any form of "pre-screening" far outweighs the benefit of not
having to deal with unpopular, alarming, obnoxious, or shocking
ideas." 6 It is thus political prudence, not political philosophy,
which underlies the freedom for this type of speech."
6
In so categorizing racial defamation as speech, however, the
courts are misconstruing its form for its substance. Superficially,
racists claim to be merely expressing legitimate thoughts on the
relationship of social groups, urban problems, politics, and the
economy-often under the cloak of patriotism. 1 7 Racial defama-
tion frequently looks like political speech." 8 One need scratch
barely beneath the surface, though, to recognize that group-libel
offers no ideas, opinions, or proposals-nothing of substance ex-
cept hatred, nothing of merit except the benefits of bigotry. It
112. Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 175 N.E.2d 162.
113. People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142, 154, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257, 268.
114. See Garvey, supra note 40, at 361 (value of student's free speech in the search
for truth is training for adult participation). Professor Shapiro more realistically identi-
fies the outcome of the marketplace model as "the tentative conviction that there is no
absolute truth," and its corollary, that "adjustment between rival partial truths is better
... than adherence to one fixed mixture of truth and falsehood." SHAPIRO, supra note
25, at 53; Schauer, Speech, supra note 36, at 915-17 (history supports proposition that
population selection among ideas arrives at truth more readily than governmental selec-
tion); Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE. L.J. 1105, 1134 (1979) (quest of
democracy is formal justice and evolving truth); Free Speech and the Hostile Audience,
26 N.Y.U. L. REV. 489, 498 (1951) ("society's interest in the attainment of the truth
through the free exchange of violently divergent ideas").
115. E.g., W.O. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY 363 (1954); SHAPIRO, supra note 25,
at 55; Television Violence, supra note 76, at 1213; Note, Offensive Speech, supra note
40, at 835. The adjectives are those of the court in Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272,
281-82, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 35.
116. SHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 47.
117. Can The Klan Come Back?, supra note 20, at 203.
118. See infra text accompanying note 151 (statement of white racist candidate).
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may be more accurately perceived as linguistic abuse (verbal as-
sault on an unwilling target); 19 the kind of fascism "which aims
at political and economic annihilation of groups . . . and uses
violence only incidentally";12 a destructive form of twisted self-
expression; 12 1 or, most simply, scapegoating 22 Just as a physical
assault is not protected self-expression, neither should the ver-
bal assault of racial defamation be misconstrued as protected
speech. 23 Just as hard-core pornography is not permitted "talis-
manic immunity" from judicial scrutiny, 24  neither should ra-
cism be allowed to "demean the grand conception of the First
Amendment.' 25
D. Racial Defamation as Nonspeech
At the very least, racial defamation is "covered but out-
weighed.' 1 26 In Justice Stevens' hierarchy of constitutional pro-
tection, it is mired very near the bottom. 27
119. Riesman uses the term "verbal sadism." Fair Game, supra note 38, at 1088. See
also Nimmer, supra note 27, at 949-50.
120. Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 25, at 753. See also Riesman, Fair Game,
supra note 36, at 1089 (verbal attacks used in early stages of fascism, as an initial build-
ing and unifying anti-democratic tool, while the group is small and/or weak).
121. The phrase is Garvey's, supra note 40, at 365.
122. See Nimmer, supra note 27, at 949 (freedom of speech as safety valve); D. BELL,
RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 59 (1973); Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 25, at
731. Arguably the interest is stronger, since racial targets are substantively injured-by
the content-whereas the captive audience is harmed only by the use of the context, a
lesser infringement. There is some conceptual similarity between the captive audience,
and the unwilling victimized group, so that protection of groups libelled racially is as
significant as protection of the captive audience.
123. See Haiman, supra note 54, at 42 (discussing the position of Zechariah Chafee,
Jr., that some expression is "akin to a body blow").
124. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269. Analogously, the claim that al-
legedly obscene material has first amendment value (serious literary, educational, scien-
tific or artistic worth, or advocates a position, or intends to impart information) is as-
sessed by a reviewing court. The bare claim does not close the matter. F. SCHAUER, THE
LAW OF OBSCENITY 36-53 (1976). Of course, attempts to camouflage the nature of racial
defamation may not even be made. Handbills circulated by the Nazis prior to their
planned demonstration in Skokie contained statements blatantly derogatory to Jews;
some denied the Holocaust or made otherwise false representations of verifiable histori-
cal fact. Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308, 331 (1979). The white
racist campaign advertisement was similarly overt. See infra text accompanying note
157.
125. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973).
126. Schauer, Codifying, supra note 107, at 305.
127. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 781 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Indeed, it is difficult to see anything about racial defama-
tion that would justify its participation in the marketplace of
ideas. Citizens would not be impoverished by the loss of a politi-
cal-moral issue about which each must "make up his own
mind. 1 26 All the political, economic, social, and psychological is-
sues of American life would remain to be debated. Racial defa-
mation can be proscribed not as a "strange doctrine" '29 or a false
idea, but as a form of assault, as conduct. The speech clause pro-
tects the marketplace of ideas, not the battleground.
The Supreme Court's treatment of the religion clauses of
the first amendment 30 provides an apt analogy. One is abso-
lutely guaranteed the freedom to believe whatever one wishes,
but not the right in every case to translate belief into action. 3 '
The "preacher of strange doctrine"' 3 2 cannot be restrained from
preaching, but the practice of doctrine, strange or otherwise,
may be regulated. 13 3 Only in total abstraction could racist ideas
be freely offered in the democratic marketplace of speech. 34
128. Wellington, On Freedom Of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1135 (1979).
129. Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 281-82, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 35.
130. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof."
131. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 396 (1940), "freedom to believe and free-
dom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be." Id.
at 303-04. This dual aspect was reaffirmed expressly in School Dist. of Abington Twp. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (statute requiring Bible reading in public schools struck
down) and Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing laws upheld).
132. Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 281-82, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 35.
133. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
134. Whether doctrinal and practical racial hatred can be distinguished is arguable.
The expression of racism's theory tends to expose the targeted group to bigotry and
prejudice. An objective discussion of the South African system of apartheid would be
protected by the speech clause, as would the study of the Bible as literature, without
violating the establishment clause. See School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. at 223-25. Even cast in its most favorable light by the official interpretations,
apartheid is a doctrine of "separate but equal." But in the United States, the conclusion
is final: forced, imposed separation is inherently unequal. Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1953). Where the speaker becomes an advocate for apartheid, therefore,
the impermissible line is crossed. The speech, arguably, is inherently racially defamatory.
See also Brown, Racialism and the Rights of Nations, 21 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1, 3 (1945)
(distinguishing the principle of unqualified racialisms from the implied racism of dis-
criminatory and paternalistic behavior). But see Wellington, On Freedom of Expression,
89 YALE L.J. 1105, 1131-33 (1979) (arguing that there is no such thing as a closed issue,
including the issue of genocide); and SHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 135 ("we can never be
sure that any statement is true").
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As mentioned earlier, pornography does not "preach sex"; it
offers itself as a sexual surrogate, its purpose to stimulate a re-
sponse.1" The speech clause of the first amendment does not
apply to pictorial display so minimally cognitive and essentially
physical. Analogously, racial defamation does not merely
"preach hate"; it is one way hatred is practiced by the speaker,
who seeks to stimulate his audience to a like response.136 Race is
a trigger; a whole series of emotionally conditioned responses
follow. 3 7 The Nazis in Germany understood perfectly the rhe-
torical uses of racism."8 Contemporary hate-groups likewise ma-
nipulate the "boogie, '' s making little pretense toward persua-
sion but much toward prejudice.4 0
When the state treats racial defamation as constitutional
speech or advocacy, it distorts the relationship between govern-
ment and individuals. 4 'The speech clause of the first amend-
ment is intended to protect individuals from direct governmen-
tal domination of opinion, or indirect suppression of unpopular
minority positions through tyranny of the majority. But individ-
uals who are abused by reason of their race, color, or ethnicity
are also entitled to protection.14 2 When the government fails to
intervene, nonspeech has succeeded in its masquerade.14 1 Vic-
135. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
136. See Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 275, 211 N.Y.S. 25, 29, where the court
acknowledged that "[g]roup hate and fear are stimulated and expressly intended to be
stimulated in those ripe for it." Applying the traditional danger test, the New York court
found that Rockwell must be given a permit to speak, as any other "preacher of any
strange doctrine," unless a showing of irreversible harm could be made to cut him off. Id.
at 282-83, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 35-36. This is, of course, a classic contextual analysis.
137. HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 570.
138. See, e.g., Bixby, supra note 7, at 753-61; Riesman, Fair Game, supra note 36, at
1085-90; Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 25 passim; Riesman & Glazer, The Intellec-
tuals and the Discontented Classes, THE RADiCAL RIGHT 97 (1963) ("In America, Jews
and Negroes divide between them the hostilities that spring from inner conflict . . . . In
Europe, the Jew must do double duty").
139. Allport, supra note 20, at 85.
140. See Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 287-90, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 41-44 (Eager,
J., dissenting); Bixby, supra note 7, at 758-59.
141. Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 25, at 779.
142. See SHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 136 (identifying, with regard to extreme right-
wing neo-fascists, the problem of not stifling political dissent, while "thwarting their goal
of creating intergroup hatred and violence"). Id. See also POLITCAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra note 40, at 570 (here the Court's treatment of obscenity is attributed, in part, to
the inherent difficulty of affirmatively proving the widespread social harms flowing from
the speech. The conclusion applies equally to defamation of racial groups: widespread
effect, "unsusceptible of proof"). Id.
143. See Nimmer, supra note 27, at 954-55. Too much of the argument against racial
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tims can rebut by means of discussion and persuasion, " but
those are not necessarily the best means to counteract
nonspeech. 14 5
The proper analysis of racial defamation-as constitutional
nonspeech-would permit fully its regulation by the state. When
the American Nazis threatened to march through Skokie, Illinois
in the late 1970's, the American Civil Liberties Union argued
that the boundary line between protected political dissent and
unprotected group defamation would be impossible to draw and
that to attempt to draw one could ultimately force democracy to
give way to totalitarianism. 4" In the name of free speech, the
Nazis' defamatory taunts were deemed protected while the com-
munity's interests in privacy, reputation, and social order were
allowed to suffer.
To suggest that the law cannot distinguish between political
comment and racial defamation 1, 7 is akin to equating Michelan-
gelo's nudes with the salacious depictions in a 42nd Street porno
shop. But courts undertake a rigorous scrutiny of the facts
before offering protection in obscenity and pornography cases.4 8
Subtle line-drawing is also required in free-exercise-of-religion
claims. The line between racial defamation and political com-
ment should not be so difficult to draw.
E. The Test
Racial defamation occurs whenever the speaker's intention
or the perceived effect of the speech is to cast ridicule or con-
tempt upon a racial group. In every case intention and effect are
subjective determinations fully within a court's discretion.
defamation laws is bound up in rigid adherence to principle, and not enough of it ad-
dresses the central thesis of experience.
144. There were certain positive aspects which emerged from the Skokie confronta-
tion. Many people, especially the post-war generation, were reawakened to the horrors of
Nazism, and the community rallied in ecumenical fashion behind the rights of the holo-
caust survivors and against the Nazis. But these do not justify the denial of government
protection to the persons defamed in the first place. See also Neier, supra note 33, at 7-
8.
145. Nimmer, supra note 27, at 954.
146. The Beauharnais opinion rejects this scenario, 343 U.S. 250, 263-64.
147. People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142, 154, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257, 268.
148. See generally Schauer, Obscenity, supra note 36, at 156-57.
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For example, the following situations could give rise to a
finding of constitutionally punishable racial defamation:
* A talk-show host is discussing reparations for Japa-
nese-Americans interned in concentration camps in the
United States following the attack on Pearl Harbor. A
caller expresses disbelief. "Do you know what those peo-
ple did? I know .... .
* Prior to a planned demonstration, Nazis circulate
hand-bills containing statements derogatory of Jews and
denying that the Holocaust ever took place. 5 '
* A politician says, "I am the only candidate for U.S.
Senator who is for the white people. I am the only candi-
date who is against integration. All of the other candi-
dates are race mixers to one degree or another. I say we
must repeal the civil rights law, which takes jobs from us
whites and gives them to the niggers. The main reason
why niggers want integration is because they want our
white women. I am for law and order with the knowledge
that you cannot have law and order and niggers too."' 5
In each of those cases a court should have been clearly
within its discretion to determine that what underlay such
sweeping indictments of Japanese-Americans, Jews, and blacks
was not history, but prejudice. In short, a judge or jury should
be free to discern, and allow punishment of, bigotry masquerad-
ing as history or political science.
Not all statements, of course, are as clear-cut as those noted
above. Take the case of William Shockley, a Nobel Laureate in
Physics, who claimed that on the basis of certain intelligence
tests that he had conducted, he could demonstrate that blacks
were genetically inferior. 5 ' Should such a claim be protected by
the first amendment? According to the formula suggested above,
149. Comments made by a caller to the Fred Fisk Show, 885 FM (Wash., D.C.), Sept.
16, 1983. The issue of the United States internment policy necessarily includes explora-
tion of the rationale put forward at the time: the perceived threat of Japanese-Americans
as a potential Fifth Column. Whether the caller's speech constitutes genuine discussion,
or mere racially based prejudice and expression of contempt for the Japanese as a group,
would be a factual matter, to be determined in view of all the circumstances.
150. See Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, supra note 32.
151. F.C.C. News Report, No. 10844 (Aug. 3, 1972), reprinted in D. BELL, RACE, RA-
CISM AND AMERICAN LAW 357 (1973).
152. See the discussion in Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, supra note 32.
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not necessarily. A court could constitutionally decide that
Shockley's personal conclusion about racial inferiority (as op-
posed to the data itself) was wrongfully motivated and therefore
defamatory. Similarly, where a study of illegitimate single, teen-
age births indicated a higher percentage of babies born to single,
teenage black mothers than to single, teenage whites, it could be
defamatory for one to state openly that the study proved that
black girls are predisposed to promiscuity simply because they
are black.
Analagously, a court would be well within constitutional
bounds to hold that the display of swastikas does not contribute
significantly to any important political discussion of fascism.15 3
Although that movement's generic symbol-the rod and bundle
of arrows-bears legitimate political connotations, the swastika
was Hitler's personal symbol as well as the insignia for the Na-
zis' anti-semitic ideology of "aryan" superiority. Its display is es-
sential only to convey the message that genocide is justifiable.1 54
Of course, a court would also be constitutionally capable of
adopting a more libertarian approach without having to invoke
constitutional necessity as its rationale. As the Supreme Court
pointed out in Ferber, it will monitor not only the broad sup-
pression of speech, but the overprotection of verbal expression
as well.1 55
153. If courts believe that defamation (including symbolic speech) of a racial or eth-
nic group could be a likely part of politically significant speech, they will remain unwill-
ing to permit its regulation or punishment. This is possibly the critical element in the
argument for regulation. Cf. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754 (1982) (citing
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)).
154. A more likely modern question is where anti-Zionism fits into these issues. The
conclusion of the D.C. Circuit Court in Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. F.C.C.,
403 F.2d 169 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969), is probably correct. The position
of the ADL that anti-Zionism per se constituted an appeal to racial or religious prejudice
was not accepted by the court. In the facts, no direct expression of anti-Jewish attack
was made. The court accepted the FCC's position that it would be impractical (and vir-
tually impossible) to separate the appeals to reason and to prejudice. Id. at 172. But a
direct anti-semitic appeal to prejudice would be separable. Then circuit court Judge Bur-
ger reminded the FCC of its "duty to consider a pattern of libellous conduct," treating it
as something distinct from the merely unpopular speech anti-Zionism was found to be.
Id.
155. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747.
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F. What Would Happen Elsewhere
The test proposed above is necessary only under a constitu-
tional form of government in which free speech is given an espe-
cially exalted jurisprudential status. That is to say, only in
America. But while the importance we accord the first amend-
ment may reflect a noble and commendable preoccupation with
fundamental liberty, the more restrictive approach of other
"free" countries is no less high-minded and could well prove the
wiser course. It is not only a nation's social philosophy which
determines the degree to which it will dictate or tolerate a sys-
tem of laws, but its historical experience as well. Sweden, for
example, specifically bans the wearing of an unauthorized mili-
tary costume in public: "It is prohibited to carry uniforms or
similar clothing that identify the political orientation of the per-
son wearing the uniform.1' 56 Sweden also prohibits the defama-
tion of a race:
If a person publicly or otherwise in a statement or other
communication which is spread among the public threat-
ens or expresses contempt for a group of a certain race,
skin color, [or] national creed, he shall be sentenced for
agitation against [an] ethnic group to imprisonment for
at most two years or, if the crime is petty, to pay a
fine. 1 57
No doubt these laws, enacted after World War II, were in
direct response to the horrors of the Holocaust. Taken together,
156. This prohibition can also apply to parts of uniforms, arm bands, and other simi-
lar clearly visible means of identification. Violations are punishable by day fines (deter-
mined by one day's income). SFS 19947:164.
157. 16 SWED. PENAL CODE § 8 (1971), reprinted in 17 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOR-
EIGN PENAL CODES (1972). In Canada, a Special Committee on Hate Propaganda
reported:
While . . .over the long run, the human mind is repelled by blatant falsehood
and seeks the good, it is too often true, in the short run, that emotion displaces
reason and individuals perversely reject the demonstrations of truth put before
them and forsake the good they know. The successes of modern advertising, the
triumphs of impudent propaganda such as Hitler's, have qualified sharply our
belief in the rationality of man.
Not all democracies would base the prohibition of racial defamation on legalistic or
moral grounds. For example, as an Australian law professor recently told the author in a
private conversation, the Nazis would likely be prohibited from marching in the streets
of Sydney "because it would be bad for tourism."
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it seems clear that a march of Nazis through the streets of
Stockholm would be preventable as a clear violation of the law,
unprotected by any claims of "fundamental freedom." While
such provisions would quickly be challenged in the United
States and likely found wanting under the Constitution, in Swe-
den they remain accepted, untested, and innocuous. 58
In Denmark as well, sharp limitations are placed upon
speech that amounts to racial defamation. Section 140 of the
Danish Criminal Code provides:
Any person who exposes to ridicule or insults the dogmas
of worship of any lawfully existing religious community
in this country shall be liable to simple detention, or in
extenuating circumstances, to a fine. 59
Section 266b further provides:
Any person who, by circulating false rumors or accusa-
tions persecutes or incites hatred against any group of
the Danish population because of its creed, race, or na-
tionality shall be liable to simple detention or, in aggra-
vating circumstances, imprisonment for any term not ex-
ceeding one year.6 0
Likewise, group-libel in Great Britain is punishable under
the Race Relations Act of 1965, Section 6(1) of which reads:
A person shall be guilty of an offense under this section
if, with intent to stir up hatred against any section of the
public in Great Britain distinguished by colour, race, eth-
nic or national origins-
(a) he publishes or distributes written matter which is
threatening, abusive or insulting: or
(b) he uses in any public place or at any public meeting
words which are threatening, abusive or insulting, being
158. Author's taped interviews (in May of 1982) with Gunnar Karnell, Professor of
Law at the Stockholm School of Economics; Per-Erik Nilsson, Chief Ombudsman of
Sweden; Thorsten Cars, Swedish Press Ombudsman; and Gustaf Petren, a Justice of the
Swedish Supreme Court. But see Oberg, Is Sweden Ripe For Racism?, 27 SocIAL CHANGE
IN SWEDEN 6 (Feb. 1983) (law and attitude-changing going together). Sweden's laws may
be tested more frequently if what some perceive to be increasing anti-semitism
continues.
159. DANISH CRIM. CODE § 140.
160. DANISH CRIM. CODE § 2666.
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matter or words likely to stir up hating against that sec-
tion on grounds of colour, race, or ethnic or national
origins. 161
In addition, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of
Europe adopted model legislation in 1966 which reflects the po-
sition of other democratic nations:
Article 1
A person shall be guilty of any offence:
(a) if he publicly calls for or incites to hatred, intoler-
ance, discrimination, or violence against persons or
groups of persons distinguished by colour, race, ethnic or
national origin, or religion:
(b) if he insults persons or groups of persons, holds
them up to contempt or slanders them on account of
their distinguishing particularities mentioned in para-
graph (a).
Article 2
(a) A person shall be guilty of an offence if he publishes
or distributes written matter which is aimed at achieving
the effects referred to in Article 1 ....
Article 4
Organizations whose aims or activities fall within the
scope of Articles 1 and 2 shall be prosecuted and/or
prohibited.
Article 5
(a) A person shall be guilty of an offence if he publicly
uses insignia of organizations prohibited under Article 4.
(b) "Insignia" are, in particular, flags, badges, uniforms,
slogans, and forms of salute. 162
The precise way in which personal freedoms are or should
be codified, therefore, depends upon one's orientation. That a
161. As early as 1732, England recognized racial defamation as actionable. In King v.
Osborne, 2 Barn. K.B. 166, the defendant was tried and convicted for accusing London's
Portuguese Jews of racial murder.
162. EUR. CONSULT. Ass. DEB. 18TH SEss. (1966).
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particular system of liberty is better than another is fuel for
endless debate, and is as likely to have good arguments all
around as it is unlikely to be resolved. For example, who is to
say that the American Bill of Rights is a better system of liberty
than the laws of other democracies, or that any of them are ethi-
cally or practically superior to the Ten Commandments?
It is also important to note that a large gulf can exist be-
tween the theory and practice of civil liberties. The Soviet Con-
stitution, for example, is a model of guarantees for the natural
rights of man; few observers, however, would characterize life in
Russia as free by traditional democratic standards."6 3 In con-
trast, Sweden, Denmark, and Great Britain deliver a good deal
more than they promise.164
III. CONCLUSION
The proper criteria by which any personal liberty must be
measured, particularly the freedom of speech, are the degree to
which it allows an individual to impose his speech on someone
else and the deleterious effect of that speech. If either the impo-
sition or the deleterious effect is excessive the liberty must be
restricted. The effect of racial defamation is demonstrably dele-
terious, lacking any constitutional value. Its imposition is the
verbal counterpart of a body blow to all persons swept within
the scope of its contempt, as well as to the social fabric of Amer-
ican democracy. After all, the ultimate liberty is not freedom of
speech, but the right to secure one's life.16 5
163. See R. SHARLET, THE NEW SOVIET CONsTrrrroN oF 1977 16-17 (1978) and LEVIT-
SKY, COPYRIGHT, DEFAMATION AND PRIVACY IN SOVIET CIVIL LAW (1979).
164. See generally Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42
COL. L. REV. 727 (1942).
165. See W. BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE & THE FIRST AMENDMENT 245 (1957). "This
nation should not permit a powerful group of Hitlers or Stalins, even if they are silent, to
develop-no matter how honestly or sincerely they hold to the Nazi or Communist ideol-
ogy. To the extent to which they are bred among us, they represent a failure on the part
of the law." Id. at 239. Berns is hardly alone among legal scholars with this view. Profes-
sor Edwin S. Corwin wrote, more than a decade before the Beauharnais decision:
Freedom of speech and press has frequently more to fear from private oppres-
sors than from other minions of government; conversely ... there are utterances
which cannot be tolerated on any scale without inviting social disintegra-
tion-incitations to race hatred, for example ....
"Liberty and Jurisdictional Restraint," quoted by Berns at p. 149. And Professor David
Reisman, in Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition, PUBLIC POLICY, Vol. III (1942),
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We have long refused to corrupt the first amendment by
saying that it protects obscene or dangerous speech. Utterances
which cause damage to an individual's reputation are likewise
left unprotected. But can one conceive of speech that is more
damaging to a free and civilized society than racial hatred and
contempt-whether it is a subtle disparagement of human dig-
nity or an explicit plea for the destruction of a race?
That group-libel statutes are currently in the criminal codes
of just five states166 reflects ignorance of content-based excep-
tions to the free speech clause of the first amendment, the care-
ful consideration of which would lead to the conclusion that
group-libel need not be constitutionally protected.
Beauharnais v. Illinois, standing for the proposition that
libelous utterances directed against groups are not protected
speech,167 has never been overruled.168 Indeed, it continues to be
cited with approval by federal and state courts. 169
Other democracies have chosen to protect themselves and
their people by banning such verbal assaults.1 70 But in America
the courts have ruled that Nazis must be permitted to march in
public streets even though, as Justice Blackmun rightly ob-
served, "every court has had to apologize for that result."' 71 It is
wrote:
A public policy for freedom of speech or any other single liberty of like impor-
tance should ...have as its goal the maximization of its valid uses and the
minimization of its invalid uses. How this is to be done, under the conditions of
today, is a difficult, if not an intractable question of methods.
Quoted by Berns at p. 160.
166. See CONN. GEN. STAT. Sec. 53-37 (West 1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 Sec. 27-1
(Smith-Hurd 1977). (See Committee Comments - 1961, Revised in 1970 by Charles H.
Bowman); MAss. ANN. LAWS. ch. 272, Sec. 98c (Michie/Law Co-op, 1980); MoNT. CODE
ANN. Sec. 45-8-212 (1984); Nav. REv. STAT. Sec. 2100-510 (1979).
167. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250.
168. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 82.
169. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747; Central Hudson Gas & Electric v.
Public Service Comm., 447 U.S. 592 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Sunward Corp. v.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 602 (1983); Rafferty v. Hartford Courant Co., 416
A.2d 1215 (Conn. 1980); DePhilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I.
1982); Leech v. American Booksellers Ass. Inc., 582 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1979).
170. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
171. Smith v. Collin, 436 U.S. 916, 918 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For similar
arguments that group-libel laws are (or should be) constitutional, see Note, Group Vilifi-
cation Reconsidered, 89 YaLE L.J. 308, 332 (1979), and Note, Group Defamation and
Individual Actions, 71 CAL. L. Rav. 1532, 1556 (1982).
The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith is not opposed in principle to the pun-
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time for courts to stop apologizing and to begin properly analyz-
ing the nature of racial defamation. The legitimate interests of
its victims, who in the long run include all of us, should not be
sublimated to a blind and, in this situation, misplaced principle.
To believe that all ugly ideas will wither when aired would
be the height of naivete. It would cast contempt upon history. It
would ignore the most frightening paradox of our time: that the
utterly despicable Nazi philosophy was born, after all, as a legiti-
mate expression of political thought, and flourished amid the ut-
terly civilized German culture, and was embraced by the utterly
sophisticated German people. Repressing private thoughts of ra-
cial superiority may be impossible, but refusing the free expres-
sion of the idea may be necessary to the survival of democratic
principles.
Punishment of racial defamation has not jeopardized liberty
elsewhere, nor would democracy in America suffer were bigots
prohibited from mongering hatred on the public streets. Events
of the Twentieth Century should have taught us, once and for
all, that the pith of racial extremism rests in the racists' fer-
vently held beliefs, in their political thought, in their ideas, in
their "truth"-none of which the freedom of speech was
designed to protect, and none of which should be allowed to per-
vert the nobility of the first amendment.
ishment of those originating or disseminating group libel. It takes cognizance of the pos-
sibility of such libel presenting a clear and present danger to public order. It is not con-
vinced that any of the broad, general group-libel proposals heretofore considered in
various law-making bodies in the United States are satisfactory or constitutional. Yet the
possibility of enacting such legislation should not be despaired of and we should con-
tinue to look to such legislation as an eventual possibility. The Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith approves in principle legislation extending the present proposal provi-
sions to make nonmailable, cards or envelopes which bear on their face libels of racial or
religious groups.
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